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In this paper I shall criticise the notion of objectivity in design research methodology. I shall argue that the 
requirement for such objectivity is either implicit in the phrasing of research degree regulations, or is widely 
assumed in their interpretation. The philosophical error is the assumption that objectivity is either 
methodologically possible or desirable. 
  
I raise four temptations for the research student: the apparent benefits of the scientific method, objectivity 
and knowledge, objectivity in aesthetics, and objectivity in PhD examination. In each case I raise objections 
that question whether objectivity has really been achieved, and whether the method can be applied in design 
research. I conclude that the appropriateness of any method is demonstrated by the validity of the outcomes 
it produces as judged in context by subject peers, and not by tests based on false or unachievable notions of 




On Method: the problem of objectivity 
 
The argument of this paper is that there are several temptations for students, and for some supervisors, to 
adopt inappropriate research methods because they appear to offer objectivity. I shall suggest four such 
temptations and raise objections to each. I shall then offer a counter argument that abandons the quest for 
objectivity on the basis that it is neither possible nor desirable. 
  
The first temptation is that students who have been educated in design have a naïve view of what science 
students do when undertaking a research degree. This problem has at its base the fact that most students 
have arrived in an arts discipline precisely because they have rejected a science one, or been rejected by its 
teachers, and that the education system therefore separates students at an early stage and preserves their 
ignorance of what lies on the other side of the fence. If you seek institutionalised evidence for this great 
divide you have only to enter the British Library and ascend the main stairs to find, at the top you must turn 
one way for the sciences and the other for the arts. 
  
We are often told that research in the arts is a relatively new activity, especially that which leads to a 
research degree. So what view of research methods filters through the internal windows of the British Library 
from the more established realms of science? It is "the scientific method." This method has resulted in 
unequivocal advances in medicine, technology, etc. and seems to have increased our knowledge of the 
external world. In particular it offers us a method of quantification and thereby "control of Nature." So there is 
a temptation for the naïve arts student that science offers demonstrable benefits from a unified method that 
is applicable across many disciplines. I propose that under pressure from supervisors and others to be 
explicit about methodology from the outset, the scientific method is unduly tempting. But we have already 
noted one benefit of this method that would seem difficult for the arts student to take advantage of, and that 
is the quantification and control of Nature. As a result we see some arts students diverted into making 
studies of materials or applications using new technology, and other pseudo-scientific arts research. 
 
The second temptation arises from the research degree regulations themselves. Most in the UK have their 
roots in the superseded CNAA regulations and their stipulation that the research makes "an original 
contribution to knowledge." The idea that an artefact, etc. can be a contribution to knowledge is not a phrase 
that comes "trippingly on the tongue" to most of us. It is a contribution to the materiality of the world, to 
experience, to culture, to interpretation; but to knowledge? Thus the student, and sometimes their 
supervisors, reach for their philosophy books in the search for a definition of knowledge. The theory of 
knowledge (epistemology) takes as its starting point the tacit definition that knowledge is in some way 
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related to truth and certainty. Thus knowledge is assumed to be independent of the researcher and 
objective. 
[211] 
So readers of, for example, John Hospers's excellent "Introduction to Philosophy," will find references to 
Descartes, Ayer, etc. all of whom advocate methods leading to objective knowledge. When we ask, "what 
kind of knowledge do we get by this procedure?," we find that knowledge may consist of, for example: 
certainty of first-person experience but doubt about others [Descartes], doubt about the self [Berkeley], 
certainty that reality lies beyond human experience [Kant], that there is nothing more real than that which is 
here and now [Heidegger], and the cautiously expressed view of common-sense which most of us hold as a 
fact; that the Earth has been here for longer than I have [Moore]. I propose that if students discover that 
applying epistemic methods uncovers no more useful facts than these, then they may well think that this 
knowledge is a disappointment. 
  
The third temptation is Kantian aesthetics. Taking our motivation as being a quest for a method that will 
generate knowledge, but knowledge that is more applicable to design research than that produced by the 
scientific method or by metaphysical epistemology, I propose that Kant's works might seem an attractive 
place to visit. Not that Kant is known as an attractive read in the conventional sense, but to our aspiring 
researcher here is someone who understands method and has attempted to apply a rigorous process to the 
problems of aesthetics and come up with some specific things to say about aesthetic knowledge. In 
particular, one of his main findings is that objective aesthetic judgement, the "judgement of taste," is possible 
and therefore The Critique of Judgement is presumably compulsory reading for research students, [but 
unfortunately compulsory for their supervisors too]. 
 
A lightening survey of Kant's quest to account for the possibility of aesthetic objectivism might proceed thus: 
an aesthetic response is our first-hand, direct, felt response to a particular object. We cannot summarise 
what makes for an aesthetic response in terms of general rules, and so it is not to these general rules that 
we react. However, this causes a problem because we do not all react uniformly to particular objects 
whereas there is at least a possibility that we might react uniformly to general rules. If aesthetic value were 
an inherent property of objects one would expect considerable uniformity of reaction. We don't so it isn't. 
Thus Kant seeks to account for "correct" aesthetic judgement by achieving a uniform intellectual vantage-
point that we can each achieve by virtue of our mental construction as human beings. This vantage-point is 
called "disinterestedness" and consists in freedom from desire, practical concern and conceptual 
understanding. Aesthetic judgement consists of both an experiential and a reflective component. The 
resulting "pure judgement of taste" would be uniform if individuals were to achieve the appropriate 
contemplative conditions. 
 
I have now advanced three temptations that I believe lie before the aspiring design researcher as false 
models of how to progress valid research. 
[212] 
But these temptations are not just placed before the unwary student, but are institutionalised in the process 
of studying for, and awarding, a research degree. This brings me to my fourth temptation which is a 
temptation for the supervisor. It is driven by the uncomfortable knowledge that at the end of three to six 
years of research endeavour by the student, the results will be examined by total strangers on whose say-so 
it will stand or fall. Thus, anticipating the demands of the examiners becomes a key role for the supervisor. 
What will the examiners be looking for? 
 
The experienced academic knows that assessments should be valid and reliable. Thus the criteria must 
have some sort of objectivity about them and be independent of the personal preferences of the examiners. 
The pressure of the examination process therefore reinforces the anxiety of both the student and the 
supervisor that the research methods themselves must demonstrate objectivity because the outcomes will 
be assessed by a process that demands objectivity. 
 
I have now proposed four separate ways in which the design researcher might be tempted and I have 
suggested that the temptations are illusory. I shall now proceed to offer some objections. 
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First, the apparent benefits of the scientific method. What is the view of the scientific method from the 
discipline-specific location of design? The "control of Nature" is not very attractive. We seek the control of 
materials, but the artefacts themselves function in a cultural and aesthetic context. The contribution that a 
design artefact makes to knowledge requires the control of reception aesthetics, not of the control of Nature. 
  
Because a correspondence is assumed between the scientific model or theory and the external world that it 
seeks to represent, control within the model may be replicated by control of the external world. According to 
Kuhn (1970), in scientific revolutions, we see changes in the dominant paradigm or model, and such 
changes enable new representations of Nature which thereby permit better control of it. But the 
representational relationship in design is more complex. Although, for example, design semantics is 
informed by the psychology of perception, it is also engaged in the social and cultural nexus. It is therefore 
revised as often by changes in society as by changes in cognitive models. According to Berger (1972), in 
aesthetic revolutions we are given new "ways of seeing" that do not render the old ways obsolete. In 
particular, the new way repositions the viewer in relation to the artefact. Nothing in the perceptual model has 
changed, the visible appearance remains the same. However, the interpretation: what it means, has 
changed. The unavoidable fact that the viewer is situated in a cultural relationship with the artefact need not 
be a disadvantage. It is only a disadvantage if that situatedness goes unrecognised. This is the contribution 
of Irigaray, Derrida, and others. 
 
Second, the objectivity of knowledge. Our guide will be Popper but our starting point will be Bacon. It was he 
who suggested that by following a 
[213] 
certain procedure of experimentation and judicious description, the laws of Nature might be identified. 
However, his inductive method was criticised by Hume on the basis that no quantity of observations is 
sufficient to establish the necessary or causal relationship between events and the laws of Nature of which 
they are supposed to be symptoms. Our habit of connecting one event with another is more expressive of a 
law of psychology than a law of Nature. Unfortunately it is exactly this habit which underpins the whole 
scientific method, and even Bertrand Russell admitted it could not be substantiated as a valid inference 
(Russell 1961: 647). 
 
So does this criticism mean that the scientific method does not generate objective knowledge? Well, only in 
part. We need to change our concept of "objective" to "provisional." Popper's revision is to say that the 
scientific method is verifiable. The more resistant a result is to systematic attempts to falsify it, the more valid 
it becomes as an inductive conclusion. Thus scientists do not have at their disposal the kind of wonder-
method that designers suppose. The scientific method produces provisional conclusions that are as strong 
as the strength required to falsify them. There is an objectivity to Popper's method: in that it is universally 
applicable, but the results are just conditional. Thus Popper says both "statements of experimental results 
are always interpretations of the facts observed; that they are interpretations in the light of theories" (Popper 
1972a: 107) and "the belief that we can start with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of 
a theory, is absurd" (Popper 1972b: 46). 
 
Third, Kantian aesthetics. The freedom from desire, practical concern and conceptual understanding bring 
with them three disadvantages. To free oneself from desire, practical concern and conceptual understanding 
presupposes these conditions as constraints on aesthetic judgement. Take, for example, "desire" in the 
sense of "an imagined representation that tends towards its satisfaction" (Kant 1980: 178). Would we today 
want to say desire is part of, but a hindrance to aesthetic judgement? Our current use of the term in 
commodification still has [supposed] satisfaction at its core, but the extent to which we commodify aesthetic 
judgement is the extent to which we attach it to something material and capable of manipulation rather than 
preserving it in the realm of aesthetics. So while it might be "part of...," the notion that it is a "hindrance to..." 
is the point at which we part company with Kant. Similarly "practical concern," being the extent to which an 
object is complete without needing a purpose or application (Kant 1980: 236) is not, I suggest, compatible 
with contemporary aesthetic judgement because we do not exclude the objects of design, etc. from 
consideration. Finally, freedom from "conceptual understanding," to the extent that it emphasises 
imagination as a counterpart to cognition (Kant 1980: 190), is incompatible with notions such as design 
semantics.  
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Fourth, the objectivity of assessment. The examiners are subject peers, who 
[214] 
are required to apply the university's regulations to the assessment of a PhD. The research must provide an 
"original contribution to knowledge." Therefore the examiners cannot be expert in exactly this part of the field 
since it is the researcher's contribution: the researcher is the expert about that. But it should also "place the 
research in a critical and cultural context." Thus "2+2=4" as a final thesis submitted for PhD, although high in 
accuracy, would fail this criterion. All that the examiners can do is to assess the methods by which the 
contribution was identified and manifested, and base their judgement on subject-specific precedents from 
the same cultural context as that inhabited by the researcher. Both the examiners and the researcher share 
a common culture and will speak its language at the examination. Any evaluation of methods will itself be 
undertaken in a critical and cultural context. 
 
The common theme to all the temptations has been the claim of objectivity. I argue that objectivity is either 
inappropriate, e.g. temptations one and three, or unachievable, e.g. temptations two and four. But then, what 
help can we offer the aspirant design researcher when asked by a supervisor "what is your method?" This 
paper does not answer the question, but shows some common places where it is fruitless to search. The 
appropriateness of any method is shown by its use within the field of study, or its transferability to it. The 
method must withstand the critical scrutiny of the examiners for its appropriateness, i.e. the production of 
valid outcomes. However, the method does not have to withstand a test of objectivity or universality. The 
method must simply be defendable for the researcher's task and its appropriateness must be made explicit 
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